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An Empirical Analysis of the Australian Football League 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We concentrate on the redistributional aspects of sports league decisions by analyzing the 
allocation of scheduling slots in the Australian Football League. We model and empirically test a 
number of team variables that we hypothesize are likely to influence the league’s allocation of 
scheduling slots to teams. We frame each of these variables in terms of its likelihood of contributing 
to either competitive balance or “infant industry” objectives versus its likelihood of contributing to 
increased gate attendance and television viewership (viz profit) objectives. We found no evidence that 
the league’s distributional choices were consistent with competitive balance-infant industry goals. 
Rather, our results suggest that the league is pursuing a policy of profit maximization.  
 
Keywords: Australian Rules Football, Broadcasting Contracts and Sports, Competitive Balance, 
Determinants of Scheduling Slots, Scheduling Slot Allocations, Wealth Redistribution within Sports 
Leagues. 
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Scheduling Slots and Sports League Objectives: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Australian Football League 
 
1. Introduction 
Since Rottenberg (1956), economists have emphasized both outcome uncertainty and competitive 
balance across teams as the hallmarks of sports as an industry, and in recent years both phenomena 
have received considerable attention by scholars.1 Rottenberg nicely summarizes the importance of 
competitive balance: “Professional team competitions are different from other kinds of business 
ventures. … in baseball no team can be successful unless its competitors also survive and prosper 
sufficiently so that the differences in the quality of play among teams are not ‘too great’” (p. 254). In 
other words, “success,” as measured by on-field performance must circulate through the various teams 
over some reasonable time period if the league, as a collective, is to thrive. Outcome uncertainty is 
directly related to competitive balance: the balance of competition will be more even when outcomes 
are more uncertain. The corollary implies that greater certainty of outcome induces weak competitive 
balance and, as a result, fans are expected to abandon perennially-losing teams. Moreover, since 
greater uncertainty is a public good for the league, even strong teams should have an interest in 
maintaining a more even balance. 
There may, however, be a fundamental problem with the forgoing hypothesis: while it has 
largely been offered as a factual description of the objectives in sports leagues, the possibility exists 
that it is a normative proscription of what researchers and league officials alike claim should be 
important to fans and therefore sports executives. To this point, Lee and Fort (2008) specifically 
examine whether outcome uncertainty really matters to fans by examining Major League Baseball 
data over 102 years. They use several measures of uncertainty and find that only playoff uncertainty is 
statistically significant and, then, only with what the authors call “truly ambitious” league 
                                                 
1 While Rottenberg discusses “uncertainty of outcome” (p. 246), he never explicitly employs the term 
“competitive balance.” However, he clearly has the latter concept in mind in the quote provided in paragraph 
one, above (from Rottenberg, p. 254). Fort and Quirk (1995), Kesenne (2006), Sanderson and Siegfried (2003), 
and Szymanski (2003) are but a small sample of the studies that examine an array of factors, such as salary caps, 
player drafts, revenue sharing and the like, for their effects on league balance. For analyses of competitive 
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intervention. And, even though playoff uncertainty is statistically significant, its economic 
significance is “questionable” (p. 292). In other words, the claim that outcome uncertainty—and 
hence competitive balance—does actually drive the dynamics of sports as an industry and the policy 
objectives of leagues is in doubt. Rather, Lee and Fort suggest the “policy implication is that actual 
league choices may be motivated by wealth redistribution rather than concerns over competitive 
balance” (2008, p. 281). Indeed, they urge that “an alternative focus for future research is in-depth 
analysis of the wealth redistribution consequences of league choices among owners, players, and 
fans” (2008, p. 292). 
In a similar vein, Jakee et al. (forthcoming) attempt to estimate the revenue effects of 
asymmetric slot allocations to various sub-groupings of teams in the Australian Football League 
(AFL). A critical aspect of that analysis is that scheduling slots are wholly allocated by league 
officials, officials who are often characterized as having a dominant relationship with the management 
of individual clubs, if not a downright adversarial one (Stewart et al., 2005).2 The AFL might, 
therefore, be more closely compared to a league such as the NCAA in the United States, which plays 
a strong and ongoing “enforcement” role than to, say, Major League Baseball, which is often 
characterized as playing a concessionary role when it comes to its relationship with the management 
of individual clubs. While Jakee et al. do not model the correlation between scheduling slot 
allocations and competitive balance directly, they note that the large revenue asymmetries that result 
from the asymmetric allocation are hardly consistent with league objectives that balance financial 
returns across clubs. These authors also note that the actual incentives for the league quite likely 
diverge from the those that would promote competitive balance and they suggest that the league is 
maximizing its own profits when annual gate and broadcasting revenues are maximized in a given 
season. In sum, maximizing overall attendance and television viewership in a given season (which 
maximizes profits) may well involve forgoing greater balance in on-field competition.  
                                                                                                                                                        
balance in the Australian Football League, see Macdonald and Borland (2004). Lee and Fort (2008) provide a 
extensive summary of the uncertainty-of-outcome literature. 
2 The strong central control exhibited by AFL league officials can be usefully contrasted with the “cartel 
instability” of the English Premier League described in Forrest et al. (2004).  
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The aim of the current paper is to further elucidate the tension between league decisions to 
“balance” the teams and the temptation to increase revenues. We use Australia’s premier Australian 
Rules competition, the Australian Football League (AFL) as an example. Specifically, we model day-
of-the-week slot allocations to AFL teams as the dependent variable. Effectively, this approach allows 
us to explore a little scrutinized decision made by league officials and it should provide us with 
greater insights into league objectives. Given the secrecy surrounding most sports leagues’ decisions 
and their financial details, researchers can often only infer what the true objectives are.3 We therefore 
aim to specifically test for the conflict between favoring popular teams, which Jakee et al. 
(forthcoming) suggest implies increasing revenues for both the popular teams and the league, versus 
favoring weak teams in the name of competitive balance or even some version of an “infant industry” 
objective, which might be in place to protect younger expansion teams. 
Following Jakee et al. (forthcoming), we assume that certain playing slots (usually holiday 
games and Friday nights) generate more revenue, ceteris paribus, than others. This assumption is 
consistent with the few additional studies that specifically test for scheduling effects, such as 
Schofield (1983), García and Rodríguez (2002) and Knowles et al. (1992).4 Our empirical model 
examines the allocation of slots to each team for the years 1990 through 2003, which were pivotal 
years for the AFL. First, the league expanded considerably in the 1990s and concomitantly the AFL’s 
management grew increasingly independent from the interests of specific teams over this period. 
Second, several teams experienced serious financial losses motivating mergers and league bailouts; 
these financial crises, themselves, motivate an investigation into their causes and policy implications. 
                                                 
3 Pinnuck and Potter (2006) note how little is known about the detailed financial performance of specific AFL 
clubs and they use aggregate yearly figures to calculate a range of average team financial estimates. Lee and 
Fort also note, in passing, the dearth of “supporting financial data” in conducting their analysis (2008, p. 290). 
Even Forbes (Forbes, various years) is not transparent about its calculations of yearly estimates of revenue, 
operating income and “current value,” for various sports clubs in the United States (and for European soccer). 
4 These studies find that, ceteris paribus: (a) public holiday matches attract greater attendances in cricket 
(Schofield, 1983) and (b) weekend slots attract larger attendances than non-weekend slots; García and 
Rodríguez (2002) provide evidence from Spanish league football; Knowles et al. (1992) provide evidence from 
U.S. baseball.  
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Third, towards the end of this period, in 2002, a new era of historically lucrative television 
broadcasting contracts took effect.  
Specifically, we analyze whether the distribution of slots depends on any of the following: (a) 
past competitive performance, (b) previous attendance shares, (c) various sub-categories of teams, or 
(d) the 2002 broadcasting contract. We test for the significance of a club’s lagged on-field 
performance since it is the most direct test of whether the league is making policy decisions that are 
consistent with competitive balance objectives. We hypothesize that a competitive balance objective 
is consistent with allocating winning teams smaller allocations of favorable scheduling slots in 
subsequent seasons. A profit maximization objective is consistent with winning teams receiving a 
higher allocation of favorable scheduling slots. 
We include a team’s lagged attendance share as a proxy for the popularity of a club; it also 
serves as a proxy for television viewership as per Jakee et al. (forthcoming) and Lee and Fort (2008). 
Evidence that the league favors last year’s high-attendance clubs with more lucrative scheduling slots 
is consistent with a hypothesis that league officials are maximizing revenues. Evidence that the league 
favors low-attendance clubs with better scheduling slots is consistent with competitive balance 
objectives.  
We also include various sub-categories of AFL teams as independent variables because there is 
an ongoing tension between the teams from the State of Victoria, the traditional stronghold where 
Australian Rules began, and the non-Victorian expansion teams that were largely established over the 
past two decades. The AFL has instituted explicit tactics, such as recruiting and salary cap 
concessions, to nurture the expansion teams in what is essentially an “infant industry” policy. Yet 
another commonly-cited grouping among fans and the press is a subset of the Victorian clubs, the 
powerful Big-4 clubs, so known for their strong attendances, large “membership” lists (season-pass 
holders), and typically robust financial positions. See Table 1 for a list of the relevant categories of 
teams. Indeed, concern over favorable scheduling for these Big-4 or “high profile” clubs, as they have 
been called, has been noted in previous research on the AFL (Stewart, et al., 2005; and Turner and 
Shilbury, 2005), but the details of any such scheduling imbalance have remained anecdotal.  
{Insert Table 1: The 16 AFL Clubs as of the 2003 Season} 
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Our last independent variable is a dummy that tests for any effects when the historic multi-year 
broadcasting contract went into effect in 2002. This media deal was worth AU$500 million for the 
league over the five years inclusive of 2002 to 2006. The per-yearly value of this contract was nearly 
three times the amount paid during the last year of the previous contract, which had been worth 
approximately AU$36 million for the 2001 season.5 As a broader issue, scholars have begun to devote 
greater attention to articulating the role that large broadcasting contracts play in sports management. 
For example, Forrest et al. (2004) provide econometric evidence that broadcasting had a negligible 
effect on reducing actual attendance at English Premier League games while Cave and Crandall 
(2001) and Hoehn and Lancefield (2003) focus largely on some of the potential anti-competitive 
aspects of league “foreclosure” of broadcasting markets, bundling, and the vertical integration with 
media companies. Szymanski (2006) provides a useful overview of a number of sports broadcasting 
issues. Of particular relevance to our study is his review of the arguments that “collective sellers” 
(i.e., leagues that act as a single seller of broadcasting rights) have justified their cartelization of 
broadcasting rights on the basis of redistributing income across the league with a “view to sustaining 
competitive balance” as well as the need to coordinate club schedules (p. 431). In the case of the 
NBA, Fortunato’s case study (2001) finds that the league facilitates the networks in its scheduling of 
the most popular teams. In the specific case of the AFL, Stewart et al. (2005) claim that, in the 
aftermath of the historic contract, the broadcaster influenced the scheduling of games, but provide no 
evidence. Turner and Shilbury (2005) provide interview evidence that disaffected clubs felt that the 
league bowed to the broadcaster’s preferences in favoring the more popular high profile teams, but 
details are again lacking.  
If the new broadcasting contract had an effect on the allocation of slots, we hypothesize that it 
would most likely manifest itself in greater attention to a club’s ability to draw game-day audiences as 
a proxy for the potential of a club to draw television audiences; this hypothesis is consistent with the 
results in Jakee et al. (forthcoming) and with the assumption made in Lee and Fort (2008). If there is a 
                                                 
5 The exchange rate for the Australian dollar was between US$0.50 and US$0.75 over the 2001–2003 period 
that we analyze in this paper. 
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“broadcasting effect,” we expect to see an increase in the weight the league places on a club’s 
attendance shares when the contract took effect. 
Given that this paper models slot allocations as a league decision, we wish to be clear that it is 
unlike demand-for-attendance studies that specifically model the various factors that drive consumers’ 
decisions to attend sports matches.6 We therefore do not attempt to determine the independent effect 
of scheduling slots on attendance, but rather proceed with the assumption that certain slots attract 
larger attendances and/or larger television audiences than others. These slots generate more revenue 
and we expect that league (and club) officials understand this. We thus posit that league officials 
and/or club officials vie for the rents created by the more popular slots. Indeed, these are precisely the 
“wealth redistribution consequences” that Lee and Fort urged economists to consider more carefully.  
We also do not specifically model revenues as a function of slot allocations in this paper, but we 
can tie the implications of our results indirectly to revenues via the analysis provided by Jakee et al. 
(forthcoming) and the few other papers that have connected attendance to revenues.7 For example, 
Forrest and Simmons (2006) link attendance asymmetries to revenue asymmetries in the English 
Football League. They find that certain weekly slots are severely revenue-disadvantaged compared to 
others. Tainsky and Winfree (2008)—while not examining scheduling issues per se—link falling 
attendance to reduced club revenues in Major League Baseball as a result of the increased vigilance in 
steroid testing.  
Besides emphasizing the implications scheduling has for league objectives, we are interested in 
simply furthering the analysis of scheduling slots as a variable of interest in the industrial organization 
of sports. Except for the few demand-for-attendance studies that have included scheduling as an 
                                                 
6 While we do not take a demand-for-attendance approach, it is worth pointing out that game-day scheduling 
has received fairly little attention in that literature, even though scheduling would seem to be an obvious factor 
in the demand for attendance. See Borland and Macdonald (2003) for an excellent overview of nearly 100 other 
papers on the demand-for-attendance topic.  
7 Jakee et al. (forthcoming) calculate that revenues for the most highly-attended slots in the Australian Football 
League provide significantly more revenue than the least popular slot does, even though they acknowledge that 
exact revenue calculations are difficult to measure because of the proprietary nature of the financial data. One of 
the innovations of the latter paper is an attempt to estimate the additional sponsorship revenue that clubs receive 
as a result of playing in popular televised slots.  
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independent variable (Schofield, 1983; García and Rodríguez, 2002; and Knowles et al., 1992) and 
the two studies that specifically link scheduling to club revenues (Jakee et al., forthcoming; Forrest 
and Simmons, 2006), this subject has garnered very little attention even in the demand-for-attendance 
literature. Moreover, these studies do little beyond regressing attendance data on scheduling slots as 
one of several independent variables. Similarly, the competitive balance literature has examined an 
array of factors, such as salary caps, player drafts, revenue sharing, etc., for their effects on league 
balance (see, e.g., Fort and Quirk, 1995; Kesenne, 2006; Sanderson and Siegfried, 2003; or 
Szymanski, 2003). Yet, this literature has also overlooked any potential effects of scheduling. These 
omissions alone would seem to warrant greater scrutiny of scheduling slots.  
In sum, we aim to: (a) clarify the role scheduling plays in the decision of league executives, (b) 
develop a simple model of scheduling allocations that can be extended to cover other distributional 
phenomena in a league setting, (c) provide empirical support for the notion that leagues may be 
implementing policies that maximize overall attendance and television viewership at a point in time 
while potentially forgoing greater financial (and therefore on-field) balance across teams, and (d) 
determine the importance of broadcasting contracts on sports leagues’ policy decisions; in other 
words, we want to know what effects broadcasting might have on scheduling and whether there 
should be increased attention paid to these more subtle results of the broadcasting contracts. 
The paper is laid out in the following manner. The next section, 2, provides a brief overview 
of the Australian Football League. Section 3 introduces a simple distributional model that is tested in 
section 4, the latter of which provides our econometric results. We conclude in section 5.  
2. Some Background on the AFL and its Scheduling 
While our empirical analysis takes the Australian Football League as its case study, we believe our 
approach is relevant well beyond the Australian shores. In addition to the concepts we develop, the 
AFL is hardly an insignificant sport, even in an international context. For example, AFL average 
attendances were ranked approximately third in the world among professional sports leagues behind 
only the United States’ NFL and India’s Indian (Cricket) Premier League over the period 2006–2008; 
with average AFL attendances above 38,000 in 2007, they were greater than even America’s Major 
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League Baseball.8 Moreover, the AFL’s “Grand Final” may routinely be the most highly-attended 
club championship event in the world with attendances regularly around 100,000.9  
Within Australia, Aussie Rules is the most highly attended spectator sport with more than 2.5 
million people attending games in 2005–06 (ABS, 2007). In terms of electronic media viewership, the 
AFL Grand Final is one of the most-watched sporting events on television in Australia. According to 
OzTAM (2005), the official source of Australian television audience measurement, the 2005 AFL 
Grand Final was watched by a record television audience of almost 3.4 million people (approximately 
17 percent of the population), and this figure counts only the five largest metropolitan areas. 
Australian Rules is also fostering an international audience, a Roy Morgan Research poll reporting 
that more Americans (7,496,000) occasionally watched Australian Rules than Australians (7,004,000) 
between April 2002 and March 2004 (Levine and Pownall, 2004: 8).  
The AFL changed considerably between the mid-1980s and the first few years of the new 
millennium; among other things, it underwent a significant name change, from the Victorian Football 
League to the Australian Football League, as it redoubled its efforts to move from a traditionally 
State-of-Victoria-centered competition to a national one.10 League match attendances more than 
doubled throughout this period from around 2.7 million in 1985 to 5.9 million in 2003, the number of 
participating clubs increased by 33 percent from 12 to 16 (see Table 1 for a list of the legacy Victorian 
clubs and the expansion non-Victorian clubs), and match attendances increased by 60 percent for the 
11 AFL clubs that survived the full period.11 In 1990, 14 AFL clubs played 22 matches, giving a total 
of 308 team appearances at 154 matches, while the number of AFL clubs reached 16 and appearances 
increased to 352 (16 AFL teams each playing 22 games) by 1995. The number of clubs and team 
appearances remained unchanged from that point throughout the remainder of our data sample period 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Wikipedia (2008a) for a convenient list of leagues and their corresponding attendances. 
9 See “Domestic Club Championship Events” section of Wikipedia (2008b) for a list of championship events 
and list of primary sources for attendance data.  
10 See Stewart et al. (2005) or Dickson et al. (2005) for an overview of this expansion.  
11 These 11 “survivor” teams are Carlton, Collingwood, Essendon, Geelong, Hawthorn, Kangaroos, Melbourne, 
Richmond, St. Kilda, Western Bulldogs and Sydney.  
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that ended in 2003, although in 1997, Port Adelaide joined the league and a merger took place 
between the Brisbane and Fitzroy clubs.12  
AFL officials allocate fixtures (i.e., the particular matching of teams in a given round) and 
scheduling slots (i.e., the particular day and time that a given match is played) before the season of 
play begins each year. We focus solely on the latter. The nature of the allocation decision is a 
secretive matter decided by league officials and therefore little is known about it. Specifically, AFL 
scheduling slots consist of four regular weekly slots (e.g., Friday night, Saturday afternoon, Saturday 
Night and Sunday afternoon, referred to hereafter as Friday, Saturday, Saturday Night and Sunday, 
respectively) or “Other” irregular playing slots; these Other slots are typically matches scheduled on 
national holidays, during other special events, or for other idiosyncratic reasons.  
Table 2 shows that, over the 2001–2003 period, average match attendances were ranked in the 
following order: (1st) Other, (2nd) Friday (3rd) Saturday Night, (4th) Saturday, and (5th) Sunday. This 
attendance pattern is broadly similar in earlier years with the exception that Saturday Night starts off 
the period in a very distant last-place ranking and ends up in third place after Other and Friday. 
Indeed, the general trend is for Saturday Night to increase its relative ranking throughout the sample 
period, its audiences increasing over 30 percent from 2000 to 2003, alone. These patterns broadly 
conform to the studies that have examined attendance slots, such as Schofield (1983), García and 
Rodríguez (2002), Knowles et al. (1992) and Forrest and Simmons (2006), which have found that 
public holiday matches and certain weekend matches attract greater attendances.  
{Insert Table 2: Average Match Attendances by Year and Slot} 
From 1995 onward, each of the 16 clubs played once in each of the 22 rounds and a fortunate 
few were allocated the special Other slots. To provide a glimpse into the slot allocations over the 
latter period of the data sample, Table 3 lists each club’s 2002 slot allocations. The Big-4 (Victorian) 
clubs, Carlton, Collingwood, Richmond and Essendon, constitute 25 percent of the 16 AFL clubs, but 
received more than 62 percent of the best-attended Other playing slots and 48 percent of the next-
                                                 
12 The competition consisted of 12 teams between 1925 and 1987; the league expanded to include Brisbane and 
the West Coast clubs in 1987. Adelaide and Freemantle joined in 1991 and 1995, respectively, increasing the 
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best-attended Friday playing slots in that year. When it came to the least-attended slots, Saturday and 
Sunday, they received 26 percent and 14 percent, respectively. In other words, Table 3 shows that the 
Big-4 clubs generally did very well in the allocation of highly-attended Friday and Other slots. 
Carlton fared the least well of the Big-4. Table 3 also reveals that two of the Big-4, Collingwood and 
Essendon, attracted the largest match attendances in 2002, while a third, Richmond, essentially tied 
for third in attendances.  
{Insert Table 3: 2003 Slot Allocations Ranked by Average Attendance in 2002} 
3. A Simple Model of Slot Allocations 
We now turn to our analysis of how favorable and unfavorable playing slots might be decided by 
league officials. For simplicity’s sake, we discuss the mechanics of distribution wholly in terms of the 
league’s allocation of favorable slots; in our case, these will be the most highly-attended Friday and 
Other slots. The model can easily accommodate unfavorable slots and indeed we do this in our 
empirical test, below. For our dependent variables, we amalgamate Friday and Other slots into a 
composite Friday + Other slot, because Other slots are too sparsely distributed in some years to be 
treated as a continuous variable for our econometric test in the next section. Greater detail on this 
amalgamation is provided, below, in the empirical section of the paper. Similarly, Saturday Night was 
discontinuous and we amalgamated it with Sunday to improve continuity and to avoid heteroscedastic 
model errors. Figure 1 plots the percentage share of each of the three categories of slots, referred to as 
slot j, that we empirically examine: i) Friday + Other (i.e., F+O), ii) Saturday (i.e., Sat), and iii) 
Saturday Night + Sunday (i.e., SatN+Sun) for the 13 clubs between 1990 and 2003. These three sets 
of scheduling allotments are the dependent variables we seek to explain in the following analysis.  
{Insert Figure 1: Slot j’s Percentage Share of Total by Year, 1990–2003} 
We introduce our model by proposing three possible distributional scenarios concerning 
favorable slot allocations: 
1. Each team receives an equal allocation of favorable timeslots. 
                                                                                                                                                        
number of clubs to 16.  
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2. Teams do not receive an equal allocation of favorable slots: the league rewards clubs 
with favorable slots as an inverse function of some team characteristic. 
3. Teams do not receive an equal allocation of favorable slots: the league rewards clubs 
with favorable slots as a positive function of some team characteristic. 
The first option can be defined as an “equal shares” or “neutral” allocation of slots, since 
under that rule, each team receives an equal allocation of favorable slots regardless of any other 
criteria. Such an allocation disregards any sort of extrinsic characteristics of the teams. Under this 
rule, each team receives an allocation of 1/n favorable slots, where n = number of teams. Should we 
observe this particular outcome, league objectives—which we can only infer—might be either to 
allocate shares equally across teams deliberately or it may be the non-deliberate outcome of allocating 
shares on a completely random basis.  
Under scenarios (2) and (3), above, slots are not allocated equally. We now consider three 
plausible team characteristics upon which league officials might base their decisions: (a) a club’s 
match attendance of the previous season; (b) a club’s past competitive performance; or (c) a club’s 
regional or “power” status, e.g., its Victorian or Big-4 status.  
Allocating favorable slots as an inverse function of attendance, previous competitive 
performance, Victorian, or Big-4 status as per scenario (2), above, suggests that AFL decisions are 
redistributing current resources away from either winning or legacy teams. Redistributing to losing 
teams is a policy that directly targets on-field performance, and is thus consistent with competitive 
balance objectives. Redistributing to low-attendance clubs is also consistent with competitive balance 
objectives as it is expected to promote on-field balance indirectly by favoring the lower-attendance 
clubs financially. Finally, redistributing away from either the Victorian clubs or the Big-4 would have 
an ambiguous effect on on-field balance. However, it would be consistent with an infant industry 
objective that seeks to redistribute current resources away from the legacy teams toward the newly-
created expansion teams. All of the non-Victorian clubs can be considered recent entrants (expansion 
teams) or are wholesale revivals of failing Victorian teams in non-Victorian locations. Besides being 
legacy clubs, the Victorians and the Big-4 tend to be among the most financially secure (although a 
subset of weak legacy teams has faltered in recent years). The Big-4 enjoy some of the highest 
“memberships” (viz annual supporters), and they are among the top five most winning teams when it 
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comes to premierships over the 100 plus year history of the AFL and its Victorian Football League 
predecessor (i.e., Essendon and Carlton tie for the most number of premierships, Collingwood places 
second, and Richmond fifth).  
A positive relationship between allocations and these three variables as per scenario (3), 
above, suggests a bias in favor of strong teams (defined either in terms of performance or finances) or 
legacy teams at the expense of weak or expansion teams. In effect, the league would be rewarding 
popular clubs, winning clubs, or the traditional Victorian (or Big-4) clubs. None of these possibilities 
strike us as consistent with competitive balance objectives. Rather, as suggested in the Introduction, 
we posit that a positive correlation between favorable slots and any of these variables is evidence of 
profit maximization for the league as a whole. Further, redistributing in favor of the Victorian (or Big-
4) clubs is consistent with bias toward the legacy clubs (or some subset of them) and perhaps tacit 
collusion with them, since the financial interests of the high-attendance-high-viewership clubs align 
with the interests of the league management on the matter of maximizing attendance and television 
viewership. 
In turning to our basic model and the empirical tests that follow, we are interested in 
examining the problem of slot allocation in light of the three possible variations in allocational rules 
discussed above. We hope to shed light not only on how particular clubs fared, but also on any 
patterns that might emerge as the league allocates scarce favorable slots. In effect, we attempt to 
construct the league’s allocation “rule.” Specifically, we investigate whether (1) some teams received 
favorable slots as an inverse function of the extrinsic criteria we discussed, or whether (2) some teams 
received favorable slots as a positive function of the extrinsic criteria.  
We introduce our basic model by supposing there are only two teams in a league: Sydney (a 
non-Victorian expansion team) and Essendon (a Big-4 Victorian team). In a two-club context, the 
model is: 
ijtitijiiijitijijijt ATTDDATTS    11 , (1) 
where  is club i ’s share of slot ijtS j  received in year . For our analysis in this section and in the 
first set of estimations in the econometric analysis, we will take slot j to imply the most favorable 
t
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F+O slots.  is club i ’s share of total match attendances in the previous year. is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the club is, for example, Sydney (a non-Victorian club) and zero if 
it is, for example, Essendon (a Victorian club); 
1itATT iD
ijt  is a random error term. For Essendon, the model 
reduces to the following: 
ijtitij ATTS ijtOFEss  ,,
tOFSyd
  1 . (2) 
For Sydney, however,  implies that the model reduces to: iD 1
ij ijtijijij ATTS  ti   ,, 1
ij
)()( . (3) 
In light of our allocational focus, the   and ij  coefficients are constructed to measure any 
asymmetric treatment that Sydney receives in its allotment of the favorable F+O slots. As the 
coefficient on the intercept dummy, ij  provides a measure of any outright bias in allotting favorable 
slots to Sydney (regardless, for example, of attendances). In the case where 0ij , Sydney is 
receiving a greater share of the F+O slots than Essendon, which might be because of any of the 
specific attributes that we test for, such as it being a non-Victorian team, or a non-Big-4 team, or 
because of its previous on-field performance. Of course, it might also be the result of some other 
idiosyncratic reason unknown to us. The second coefficient, the slope coefficient ij , measures any 
bias towards Sydney as a result of larger attendance shares that it might enjoy. In other words, when 
0ij , a larger attendance share for Sydney is treated more favorably in terms of F+O slot 
allotments than an equal attendance share for Essendon.  
If the allocation of F+O slots were independent of match attendance, the coefficients on a 
team’s own lagged attendance, ij , and any special bias towards a particular team’s attendance 
record, ij , would be zero, or 0ij ij . Moreover, when 0ij , no asymmetric treatment for 
particular clubs exists and, ignoring random effects, the share of F+O slots, , will simply equal the 
constant term, or 
ijtS
ijijtS  . In such a case, since each club receives an identical share, ij , it is 
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obvious that nij /1 ; this is synonymous with the first scenario presented above, the equal shares 
distribution of slots. 
In the case where greater match attendances are rewarded with favorable F+O slots, 0ij  
and, if both clubs are rewarded equally for match attendances, the slope dummy, ij , will equal zero. 
If Sydney is more highly rewarded for match attendances, 0ij  and, if it is less favorably rewarded 
for match attendances, 0ij . Note that it will be true that 0ij , and therefore 1itATT ijijtS  , 
in the case where: (i) attendances are rewarded (i.e., 0ij ), (ii) attendances matter equally across 
teams (i.e., 0ij ), and (iii) only attendance matters in allocating shares. Moreover, because 
 is defined as club i’s percentage share of the previous season’s overall league attendance, it 
will be true that 
1itATT
1ij , and a club’s allocation of F+O slots, , will simply equal its previous 
season’s attendance share, or . 
ijtS
1 itijt ATTS
{Insert Figure 2: Allocation of Slots as a Function of Attendance} 
Figure 2 illustrates several of these possibilities, ignoring random effects. If F+O slots are not 
allocated on the basis of attendance and there is no asymmetry in the treatment of teams, then each of 
the two clubs in our example receives 50 percent of the slots, since all of the variables drop from the 
equation except for 5.0/1  nij . If there is outright asymmetry in the allotment of shares based 
on some other extrinsic criteria, such as a bias for or against the Big-4, Victorian or winning clubs, 
then 0ij ; indeed, this variable can be thought of as capturing any of these effects, although we 
specifically add separate dummy variables for Big-4, Victorian, and on-field performance effects in 
our econometric test. If there is, for example, some positive bias toward Sydney, 0ij . The share of 
F+O slots would therefore conform to the pattern suggested in Figure 2, in which Sydney = A and 
Essendon = B, and where A > B and A + B = 1.  
If favorable slots are rewarded proportionally on the basis of attendance, and only on 
attendance, a team’s percentage allocation of F+O slots will be exactly equal to its attendance share 
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as a percentage of overall league attendance in the previous season. If Sydney had smaller attendance 
shares in the previous season, Sydney will receive a smaller allocation of favorable slots in year t than 
Essendon will. Such a scenario is illustrated by the positively sloped line, , in Figure 2, which 
passes through the origin at 45° (i.e., 
ijS
0ij  and 1ij ). If, on the other hand, bias exists, such that 
Sydney is more favorably rewarded for any given level of attendance than its rival (i.e., 0ij ), its 
allocation will lie above the illustrated  line (where ijS 1ij ) and Essendon’s allocation will lie 
below it. In this latter case, each team will have its own  line and Sydney’s will be more steeply 
sloped than Essendon’s.  
ijS
The F+O club shares, illustrated in Figure 2, can be thought of as the “equilibrium” shares 
that we would expect each club to obtain over the long run. In any given year, however, the share for 
a particular club might not conform to its long-run equilibrium. In this dynamic setting, we expect that 
observed short-term club shares will adjust non-linearly towards their equilibrium long-run values 
over time. Figure 3 illustrates this scenario. In this example, we simply assume that Sydney’s 
equilibrium allocation (denoted ) of the favorable F+O slots, 
, is smaller than Essendon’s equilibrium allocation, 
 (i.e., 
*
SydneyS
iATT)
ij
ijijijijSydneyS ()(
*  
1
*
 itijijEssendon ATTS  0  and 0 ijij  ). This diagram implies that Sydney’s 
initial allocation, , adjusts more quickly towards its equilibrium level than does Essendon’s, 
. To accommodate this dynamic process, we augment equation (1) by incorporating non-linear 
adjustments, which allows the allocation shares, , to also depend on the inverse of time ( ). In 
our econometric test, we therefore add dummy variables to equation (1) that allow for the possibility 
that clubs differ in their speed of adjustment: 
0
SydneyS
0
SydneyS
ijtS t/1
ijtiijijitijiiijitijijijt tDtATTDDATTS    /1/111 . (4) 
{Insert Figure 3: Dynamic Adjustment of Slot Allocation as a Function of Time} 
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Thus, as ,  in the dynamic adjustment terms, such that the remainder of the equation 
represents a club’s equilibrium allocation share,  (i.e., the original equation 1).  
t 0/1 t
*
ijS
Finally, we wish to introduce the one additional variable that is key to our analysis of slot 
distributions. Besides testing for the effects of attendance, Big-4 and Victorian status, and on-field 
performance, we also test for any effects of the new broadcasting contract that went into effect in 
2002. We do this by looking for any systemic breaks in the allocation scheme in 2002 compared to 
prior years. Like the others, this variable enters our test as a dummy variable. We hypothesize that the 
league paid greater attention to a club’s ability to draw attendance and television audiences in 2002 
and that the intercept and attendance slope dummy coefficients for 2002 will be negative and positive, 
respectively. That is, a significant broadcasting effect will reduce the reduce the fixed or autonomous 
allocations of favorable slots made to clubs and increase the weight the league puts on clubs’ 
attendance shares.  
4. An Empirical Investigation of Slot Allocations: Econometric Results 
This section presents our econometric results. In the first subsection, we analyze F+O, the most 
highly-attended—or favorable—group of slots. In the second subsection, we analyze Saturday Nights 
+ Sunday (SatN+Sun). The third subsection provides our estimates of the allocation of the least 
favorable slot, Saturday (Sat).  
A. Estimations of Friday + Other Allocations 
We perform our estimations using ordinary least squares. Table 4 includes the resulting estimated 
equation for the 13 AFL clubs that played over the entire 1990 to 2002 period. These 13 clubs are a 
subset of the 17 clubs identified in Table 1, which excludes Adelaide, Freemantle, Port Adelaide and 
Fitzroy because these clubs did not survive for the entire sample period. We withhold 2003 
allocations to test out-of-sample forecast performance of the model and we control for outliers using 
dummies. We also adjusted attendance shares to conform to changes in the number of AFL clubs over 
the period.13 Where the estimated intercept and slope coefficients for particular clubs did not differ 
significantly from each other, we restricted them to equality. 
                                                 
13 The results for the nine dummy variables are not included in Table 4 in the interest of parsimony, however, 
the complete estimated equation is given in Appendix 1. To obtain the adjusted attendance shares, we multiplied 
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{Insert Table 4: Results of OLS Regressions for F+O Allocation Shares, 1990–2002} 
The equation represented in Table 4 explains 60 percent of the variance in the allocation of 
F+O slots to AFL clubs, which is notable, given the volatile and idiosyncratic scheduling allocations 
that AFL league officials made privately. The estimated coefficients are generally well determined. 
The model errors are not significantly correlated, abnormal or heteroscedastic and give no grounds for 
suspicion that the functional form is mis-specified. Our results include the following observations:  
1. The attendance variable, ATTSt–1, is very nearly significant at the 5 percent level.  
2. The 1/Time variable is strongly significant. 
3. The test for non-Victorian effects, DNONVICTORIAN, is strongly significant at the 1 
percent level.  
4. Our 2002 broadcasting dummy, D2002, is strongly significant at the 1 percent level 
as is an attendance slope dummy for the 2002 broadcasting effect (i.e., D2002ATTSt-
1). 
5. The Big-4 dummy variable was insignificant. 
6. Our two measures of club performance were insignificant. 
7. Two other dummies for particular subset of teams multiplied by 1/Time are strongly 
significant; one subset is [DCOLL + DESS] and the other is [DBRIS + DBULL + 
DCARL + DGEE + DHAW] .  
8. Two intercept dummies, one for Richmond (i.e., DRICH) and one for a particular 
group of teams (i.e., DBULL + DCARL + DGEE + DHAW), were significant. 
9. Several “slope dummies” were also strongly significant for specific teams (i.e., 
Melbourne, Richmond, St. Kilda).  
                                                                                                                                                        
the attendance shares by the adjustment factor ( tt NOAFLNOAFL 1 ), where NOAFL is the number of AFL 
clubs. The rationale is as follows. Suppose, for simplicity, that a club’s allocation is equal to its previous 
period’s attendance share. If, when 15 clubs compete, the club receives a 1/15th share of attendances, it would 
expect to receive a 1/15th share of allocations the following year. However, if the number of clubs increases 
from 15 to 16 in the following year, then we must rescale its previous period attendance share by multiplying it 
by the adjustment factor (15/16) to allow for the change in the number of clubs; otherwise the incoming 16th 
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10. Three outlier dummies for specific clubs in specific years were also significant; these 
were necessary to achieve normality in the error distribution and to validate the 
application of the standard tests. The other estimated coefficients are robust with 
respect to their exclusion and, accordingly, we do not discuss them further.  
The effects of the transitory time-adjustment fell as the sample period progressed; this result 
indicates that clubs’ shares of F+O slots adjusted more quickly towards their equilibrium values. 
Collingwood and Essendon’s actual allocation shares adjusted up most quickly towards their 
equilibrium values. Richmond, Kangaroos, Melbourne, St. Kilda, Sydney and West Coast adjusted 
less quickly down to their equilibrium values. Carlton, Geelong, Hawthorn, Bulldogs and Brisbane 
were just 1.2 percent shy of their equilibrium allocations at the outset in 1990 and this small 
disequilibrium died away as the period progressed.  
The sign on the DNONVICTORIAN dummy is negative, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, non-
Victorian teams receive inferior allocations of F+O slots. However, while the allocations to the non-
Victorian clubs, Brisbane, Sydney and West Coast, clearly differed from some of the Victorian clubs, 
they were made on a basis very similar to those given to some Victorian teams, such as Geelong, 
Hawthorn and the Bulldogs. In general, the differences between Victorian and non-Victorian 
allocations are statistically significant, but the results are nuanced as is evidenced by the several 
specific club dummies.  
When it comes to the Other Victorian clubs (i.e., the non-Big-4 Victorians), the Kangaroos 
received their equilibrium allocation on a basis identical to the Big-4 Collingwood and Essendon, 
whereas Geelong, Hawthorn and the Bulldogs received their equilibrium allocation on the same basis 
as the Big-4 Carlton. Melbourne and St. Kilda defy the trend of positively related F+O slot allocations 
and attendance shares. In the mid-1990s, Melbourne’s share of F+O slots doubled to around 10 
percent even though its attendance share was slowly drifting south; earlier, in 1993, St. Kilda’s share 
dropped from over six percent to under two percent, even though its previous season attendance share 
                                                                                                                                                        
club receives no allocation. The adjustment factors were 14/15 in 1991 and 15/16 in 1995; in all other years, the 
adjustment factor is 1 and the adjusted and unadjusted attendance shares are the same for those years. 
 
 Scheduling and League Objectives 21 
had risen. This negative relationship between attendance and F+O slot allocations was also repeated 
in later years. 
{Insert Table 5: Implied AFL F+O Slot Allocation Rule, 1990–2002} 
Table 5 conveniently illustrates the combined effects of the various intercept and slope 
dummies in each club’s particular case. Those clubs with identical effects were grouped together, such 
as Collingwood and Essendon. The implied AFL allocational “rule” suggests that each club’s share of 
F+O slots is: (i) partly autonomous (i.e., the club’s estimated regression intercept combined with any 
relevant intercept dummies); (ii) partly dependent on extrinsic factors, such as its non-Victorian status 
and an individual club’s unspecified idiosyncrasies; (iii) partly dependent on its share of previous 
season attendances (i.e., its estimated attendance slope coefficient times its share of attendances 
combined with any relevant slope dummies); and (iv) partly time-related (i.e., its estimated inverse-
of-time slope coefficient times the inverse of time combined with any relevant time dummies).14 
The 2002 dummy was strongly significant, both economically and statistically. Table 5 
specifically demonstrates the difference between the pre-2002 allocation rule and the post-2002 
allocation rule. We interpret this result as a dramatic change in the rule for allocating scheduling slots 
once the 2002 broadcasting contract came into effect. As can be noted from the coefficients, 
autonomous allocations were cut by 14.5 percent to all clubs, while the weight given to their previous 
season match attendances—or on clubs’ crowd-pulling ability—was increased by 2.2 percent. Clubs 
like Collingwood and Essendon with large member bases and attendance records received increased 
shares of the coveted F+O slots, so too did the highly-attended (but under-performing) Richmond. 
The non-Victorian clubs received reduced allocations of favorable slots in 2002.  
{Insert Table 6: Actual and Model Forecasts of F+O Slot Allocations in 2003 …} 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that while we are able to logically and empirically account for the role that non-Victorian 
status, attendance, and on-field performance plays (or does not play) in allocating slots, we obviously cannot 
account for some of the nuanced results for particular teams or groups of teams as evidenced by the various 
team dummies. It is our hope that these results will be useful for future qualitative investigation into the role 
scheduling has played for specific clubs over this period.  
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Table 6, which categorizes teams in terms of their Victorian or non-Victorian status, 
condenses and simplifies the Table 5 estimates for ease of interpretation. It gives the actual shares of 
F+O slots each club received in 2003 and our model forecasts of both the pre-2002 allocation and 
post-2002 allocation that each club would be expected to receive.15 Under the pre-2002 allocation 
rule, clubs generally received a larger autonomous allocation and attendance was not as well rewarded 
as it was post-2002. For example, the model predicts that Collingwood and Essendon would have 
each received 11 percent of the available F+O slots under the pre-2002 rule. When the rule is revise
in 2002, the model projects their allocation shares to increase to 18 percent and 16 percent, 
respectively. In fact, Collingwood and Essendon each received 18 percent of the available slots in 
2003. With the exception of Hawthorn, the “2002 effects” dominate the projected allocations of the 
remaining non-Big-4 clubs. The proportionate effect is greatest on those clubs with the smallest shares
of F+O slots and the two percent share each of the non-Victorian clubs actually received contrasts 
sharply with all of the Victorian clubs except fo
d 
 
r the Bulldogs. 
                                                
Our final estimating equation in Table 4 is also noteworthy for what it does not include. We 
tested the Big-4 as a dummy variable, itself, and found it insignificant; it was therefore dropped from 
our final estimating equation. Our interpretation is that while some of the Big-4 teams receive very 
favorable allocations, there is not a clear distinction that sets all four teams clearly apart from the 
others. Collingwood and Essendon are apparently in a “league unto themselves” when it comes to 
allocations and attendances. And, as noted, Carlton received allocations similar to Geelong, 
Hawthorn, and the Bulldogs, while Richmond received an allocation unlike any other team. 
We also tested the clubs’ performance in the previous season as measured by a dummy 
variable indicating whether a club made it to the playoffs and another continuous variable that 
measured the number of points a team amassed over the previous season as a fraction of the maximum 
points attainable. We found no correlation between either of these measures of performance and 
allocations, which, itself, is consistent with the hypothesis that the AFL ignores competitive balance 
objectives when allocating slots. 
 
15 Table 6 also gives the previous 2002 season attendance share of each club. Since 1/t = 1/15 = 0.0667 in 2002, 
the 2003 forecasts in Table 6 can be directly calculated from Tables 5 or 6. 
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B. Estimating the Remaining Slots 
As suggested above, it is impossible to statistically estimate each club’s allocation of Saturday Night 
slots on their own. From 1990 to 1992, fewer than a half dozen Saturday Night games were played 
and those attracted miserable attendances compared with any other slot (see Table 2). No games were 
played on Saturday Night in 1993, and only one was played in 1994.16 From 1995, onwards, however, 
the number of Saturday Night slots and the attendances they attracted surged. By 2003, more games 
were played on Saturday Night than on Saturday and the former attracted larger attendances than 
either Saturday or Sunday games. We were therefore forced to amalgamate the allocation of Saturday 
Night+Sunday (SatN+Sun) slots. We then separately estimate the allocation of Saturday slots.17 
i. Estimating Saturday Night + Sunday Slots 
The estimated equation for the share of SatN+Sun slots that each of the 13 clubs received is given in 
Table 7. As the F+O allocation shares are strictly endogenous in this equation, we replace these 
shares with their Table 7 projected values and then we re-estimate the SatN+Sun share equation. The 
resulting forecasts are given in column two of Table 7.  
{Insert Table 7: Results of OLS Regressions for SatN+Sun Slot Shares, , 1990–2002} ijtS
                                                 
16 West Coast received 50% of the Saturday Night slots in 1994 along with Fitzroy, which is not one of our 
surviving 13 AFL clubs.  
17 Our rationale is as follows. First, a club’s allocation of Saturday and Sunday slots in any year is simply 22 
minus the number of F+O slots it receives (which is true for all years except 1993, when only 20 rounds were 
played and the non-F+O slots allocated to a club was 20 minus its allocation of F+O slots). Friday+Other slots, 
however, represent only between 14% to 20% of the total available slots in any year. Hence, given a club’s 
estimated allocation of F+O slots, it is deceivingly easy to project its combined allocation of Saturday Night and 
Sunday slots with a high level of accuracy, even if the F+O projections are not very accurate. The number of 
SatN+Sun slots available ranged from 80 in 1990 to 226 slots in 2001 (or between 23% and 64% of the total 
available each year), whereas the number of Saturday slots ranged from 62 to 186 slots (or between 18% and 
53% of the total available slots in each year). Second, throughout the period, Saturday and Sunday were closely 
matched in terms of live audiences, but Jakee et al. (forthcoming) provide evidence that Sunday attracted larger 
television audiences in the years 2000 and 2001; in fact, over 100,000 viewers, or 23%, more watched Sunday 
AFL games than Saturday AFL games. This fact also supports amalgamating SatN+Sun slots into a composite 
category and modeling Saturday slots separately. 
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This model explains more than 75 percent of the variation in club allocations of SatN+Sun 
slots, which is high for pooled cross-section time series data; the model errors pass the usual 
diagnostic tests. In general, a club’s allocation of SatN+Sun slots varied inversely with its allocated 
share of F+O slots and also with its previous season share of attendances. This is especially true for 
Hawthorn, whose allocation was more than twice as sensitive to changes in its attendance share 
compared with other clubs. 
The non-Victorian clubs’ autonomous allocation for SatN+Sun slots was about 5 percent 
higher than the Victorian clubs over the full period. However, when we consider only the period after 
1994, the non-Victorian share of these slots fell as its attendance share grew, but then, as the square 
term implies, tapered off at lower levels. For example, between 1990 and 1994, when Saturday Night 
was a particularly unpopular slot, the non-Victorian Brisbane, Sydney and West Coast teams received 
an average annual allocation of the available SatN+Sun slots of 14 percent, 12 percent and 12 percent, 
respectively. These non-Victorians make up under 19 percent of all AFL clubs, but collectively 
averaged 38 percent of all SatN+Sun slots—over twice the average share of all AFL clubs.  
The increasing popularity of the SatN+Sun slots from the mid-1990s onwards was most 
notably marked by a sizeable fall in the share of these slots allocated to the three non-Victorian clubs. 
The combined average share going to the non-Victorian Brisbane, Sydney and West Coast fell from 
38 percent between 1990 and 1994 (i.e., approximately 13 percent each) to 25 percent between 1995 
and 2003 (i.e., approximately eight percent each), even though their combined average annual 
attendance share increased from 13.5 percent to 15.2 percent between the same sub-periods. 
These developments are reflected in the econometric estimates. The non-Victorian intercept 
dummy indicates that, other things being equal, non-Victorian clubs averaged five percent more of 
these slots than other clubs. However, the post-1994 non-Victorian attendance slope dummy shows 
the non-Victorian clubs’ allocation of these slots declined far more sharply than for other clubs whose 
attendances increased: the significant positive coefficient on the square of the same variable indicates 
the falling allocation tended to level off at a lower level (i.e., approximately eight percent). These 
results further support the hypothesis that scheduling slot decisions are inconsistent with policies that 
are designed to support the non-Victorian expansion teams. 
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The coefficient on the significant lagged dependent variable implies the explanatory variables 
have long-term effects about 20 percent greater than their immediate impact and that allocations 
adjust quickly and smoothly to these equilibrium values. We also had to include five dummy variables 
to capture outlier values for particular clubs. Two relate to the Bulldogs, whose share of SatN+Sun 
slots inexplicably spiked upwards twice in the early 1990s, and then twice downwards as the decade 
progressed; the remaining three relate to other idiosyncratic allocations.18 
We now use the estimated equation to project the club shares of SatN+Sun slots in 2003 and 
compare them with their actual allocations as a quality check on the estimated equation. The results 
are given in columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 and, with the exception of Hawthorn, the forecasted shares 
are in broad conformity with the actual outcomes. 
{Insert Table 8: Actual Allocations and Model Forecasts for SatN+Sun and Sat, 2003} 
ii. Estimating the Least-Favorable Saturday Slots 
The model projection of the share of F+O and SatN+Sun slots each club will jointly receive in 2003 
implies the projected number of Saturday slots it will receive in 2003. That is, 
SunSatNiSunSatNiOFiOFiSati NsNsN   ,,,,, ˆˆ22 . (5) 
The model projection of the number of Saturday slots club  receives, , equals the 22 
slots it must receive during the season less its projected number of F+O slots (i.e., its estimated share 
of these slots,  times their total number, ) and less its projected number of SatN+Sun 
slots (i.e., its estimated share of these slots,  times their total number, ). The 
results for 2003 are presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 8 and, with few exceptions, conform well 
with the actual number of Saturday slots each club received. We put this impression on a more formal 
footing by using equation (5) and the fitted values of  and  to make within-sample or 
historic projections of the number of Saturday slots each club received in each year between 1990 and 
i
SatN
SatiN ,ˆ
SatNiN ,
OFis ,ˆ OFiN ,
SunSatN,
sˆ
isˆ Sun
OFi , Sunis ,ˆ
                                                 
18 For example, Geelong’s allocation averaged 7% between 1990 and 1994, and it dropped dramatically to 
about 1% in 1995 and 1996, before recovering to earlier values. Richmond jumped from 6% to 10% in 1993, 
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2002.19 We then compared those projections with the actual allocations. Figure 4 provides a 
visualization of both series.20 
{Insert Figure 4: Actual and Fitted Values of Saturday Slots, 1990–2002} 
The total number of available Saturday slots oscillates between 186 in 1990 and 62 in 2000 
and club allocations range from zero (i.e., West-Coast in 2000) to 18 (i.e., Hawthorn in 1990 and 
1992); Saturday allocations display considerable variation. Notwithstanding the considerable 
variation in the actual values, the model projections track the actual series closely as revealed by the 
computed R2 = 0.81, which shows that the projections explain a significant proportion of the 
variations in the number of Saturday slots clubs received.21 The projections also serve as a qualitative 
check on how well the model-estimates F+O and SatN+Sun slots, since errors in either necessarily 
carry over into the Saturday projections. 
5. Conclusion 
We began our analysis by noting that competitive balance in sports leagues may not be as critical to 
the dynamics of sports industries as commonly thought. Indeed, there may be other objectives and Lee 
and Fort implore economists to divert more of their attention to the “wealth redistribution 
consequences of league choices…” (2008, p. 292). Our paper attempts to do just that. We analyzed 
the allocation of scheduling slots in the Australian Football League over the 1990 to 2003 period, a 
period of considerable expansion for the league as well as financial difficulty for several teams. The 
end of that period also saw the implementation of a historically lucrative broadcasting contract.  
                                                                                                                                                        
and Sydney received 15% of the allocations in 1990, well ahead of its 10% average for the full period. 
19 The fitted values  and  were obtained by multiplying their equation coefficient estimates in 
Table 4 and Table 7, respectively, by the historic values of the corresponding explanatory variables each year 
from 1990 to 2002.  
OFis ,ˆ SunSatNis ,ˆ
20 The number 22 in equation (5) refers to the number of AFL rounds and, hence, the total number of slots each 
club receives each year. It was changed to 20 in 1993, as only 20 AFL rounds were played that year.  
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We investigated whether the league’s allocation of scheduling slots to teams follows any 
discernable pattern, being principally interested in any significant asymmetries in the allocation of 
higher-revenue slots to particular teams, subsets of teams, or teams with certain characteristics. To 
this end, we developed a simple model with which to capture a number of potential asymmetries in 
allocations across teams. We then tested several variables that we hypothesized are likely to influence 
the league’s allocation decisions: (a) previous attendance shares, (b) a team’s classification as a legacy 
Victorian or expansion non-Victorian team, or its classification as one of the powerful Big-4 teams, 
(c) past on-field performance, and (d) the 2002 broadcasting contract. In the spirit of Lee and Fort’s 
suggestion to focus on redistributional dynamics, we framed each of our variables in terms of whether 
we expected it to be congruent with improving the league’s competitive balance (or supportive of its 
“infant” expansion teams), or whether we expected it to increase gate attendance and television 
viewership, thereby maximizing revenues (profits). We therefore explicitly test for the likely conflict 
between favoring popular teams, which involves increasing revenues for both those popular teams 
and the league, versus favoring weaker teams in the name of competitive balance or some version of 
an “infant industry” objective designed to protect the newer expansion teams.  
Our empirical models explain nearly 60 percent of the variation in Friday + Other slots, 78 
percent of the variation in Saturday Night + Sunday slots and over 80 percent of the variation in 
Saturday slots. In sum, we found that, until 2002, two of the Big-4 (Victorian) teams, Collingwood 
and Essendon, received a noticeably larger share of the most treasured of all the playing slots, Friday 
+ Other, compared to other clubs; this was true even after allowance was made for their attendance 
shares. Richmond, another of the Big-4 Victorians, is disproportionately rewarded with Friday + 
Other slots for its attendance share, compared with other clubs. Early in the period, the non-Victorians 
received much higher shares of the Saturday Night + Sunday slots when these slots were much less 
popular. However, the non-Victorians’ allocations were reduced after 1995, when these slots became 
more attractive.  
In terms of our model, we found that the club intercepts, ij , were non-zero and specific club 
dummies were non-uniform, 0ij . The non-uniformity dictates that the league’s allocations of the 
most-favorable F+O slots are not absolutely equal across clubs, a finding that is consistent with Jakee 
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et al. (forthcoming). While we found evidence that the league allocates on the basis of attendance (at 
nearly the five percent level of significance), it is clear that it is not attendance alone that drives 
allocations. The attendance-slope coefficients are non-unitary ( 1,  ijijij  ), from which it 
follows that allocations of favorable slots are also not perfectly proportional to a club’s share of 
(previous season) attendances. Additional criteria are therefore influencing league decisions.  
We did not find support for the hypothesis that clubs within the Big-4 category were treated 
homogeneously. We did, however, find evidence of a negative non-Victorian effect. Thus, the 
expansion non-Victorian teams received less favorable allocations of F+O slots, which suggests that, 
in its slot allocations at least, the league favors the legacy Victorian teams. This result is not consistent 
with an infant industry policy, despite stated AFL policies that suggest otherwise. 
Further evidence that the league ignores competitive balance objectives when allocating 
scheduling slots is found in our result that a club’s lagged on-field performance plays no role in the 
distribution of slots. If the league had explicitly taken account of favorable slot allocation in 
implementing its competitive balance strategies, we would have expected to see a negative 
relationship between the two performance variables that we tested and favorable slot allocations. 
Finally, the 2002 intercept and its slope attendance dummies that proxied the historic 
broadcasting contract are highly significant. We interpret this as a dramatic break with the league’s 
allocation rule prior to 2002. Autonomous club allocations were cut by 14.5 percent in 2002 for all 
clubs, while the weight given to their previous season match attendances increased by 2.2 percent for 
each club. Under the new allocation, clubs like Collingwood and Essendon—which were highly-
attended (and presumably highly-viewed on television) as proxied by their large attendance shares—
received an even larger share of the coveted F+O slots as did highly-patronized Richmond. The non-
Victorian clubs received reduced allocations of the most highly-attended slots in 2002.  
Importantly, none of the statistically significant variables that we tested would be consistent 
with a competitive balance or infant industry objective. Rather, our results support the hypothesis that 
the league is pursuing a policy of attendance and television-viewership maximization, which implies 
revenue and ultimately profit maximization. Considering that the interests of some of the legacy 
clubs, namely those which draw significant crowds or viewers, align with the league’s in maximizing 
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attendance, we further speculate on the existence of some kind of quiet collusion between these 
groups. The essence of the speculation is that additional rents are created when popular teams play in 
popular slots, ceteris paribus. These rents are then shared by the league and the high-attendance 
teams: the league receives additional revenue from a more lucrative broadcasting contract, while the 
powerhouse teams are able to capitalize on both higher gate revenue and sponsorship revenue, as 
suggested by Jakee et al. (forthcoming). The details of any such “arrangement” might be explored in 
future research. 
The significance of our broadcasting dummies is important in its own right: a number of 
authors have speculated over the effect that lucrative broadcasting contracts might be having on sports 
leagues’ decisions. Ours is perhaps the first paper to show econometrically that scheduling is 
influenced by broadcasters. Indeed, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that league’s 
officials take account of broadcasters’ preferences for televising popular teams during popular 
scheduling slots. This finding confirms earlier, largely anecdotal, claims that AFL teams that are not 
among the “highly visible” feel that they lost valuable scheduling slots after the historic broadcasting 
deals came into effect.  
Admittedly, it was beyond the scope of this paper to more fully articulate any empirical 
relationship between these allocational choices and competitive balance in the league, but we hope 
that future researchers might close this gap. Also, while our tests uncovered several variables of 
interest that were significant, it was necessary to include a number of club dummy variables. We were 
unable to explain these particular club idiosyncrasies. Nonetheless, we hope that these results will be 
useful to other observers who might be able to identify nuances in the league’s choices that have 
eluded us.  
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Table 1: The 16 AFL Clubs and Abbreviations as of the 2003 Season 
Victorian Non-Victorian 
Big-4 Other Victorian Expansion 
Carlton 
(Carl) 
Geelong 
(Gee) 
Adelaide 
(Adel) 
Collingwood 
(Coll) 
Hawthorn 
(Haw) 
Brisbane 
(Bris) 
Essendon 
(Ess) 
Kangaroos 
(Kang) 
Freemantle 
(Free) 
Richmond 
(Rich) 
Melbourne 
(Melb) 
Port Adelaide 
(Port) 
 St Kilda 
(Klda) 
Sydney 
(Syd) 
 Western Bulldogs 
(Bull) 
West Coast 
(WCst) 
Note: The 13 underlined clubs are those used in our econometric test, below, 
because they are the ones that survived our entire data sample period. 
Abbreviations used in other parts of the paper are in parentheses below each club. 
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Table 2: Average Match Attendances by Year and Slot 
Year  Other 
Fri 
Night Sat 
Sat 
Night Sun 
Total Slots & 
Ave. Attendance 
Number of Slots 16 26 186 10 70 308 
1990 
Average Attendance 32,694 20,214 24,887 9,222 20,077 23,296 
Number of Slots 22 28 186 8 86 330 
1991 
Average Attendance 30,616 26,343 22,604 7,250 22,335 23,013 
Number of Slots 16 30 170 10 104 330 
1992 
Average Attendance 49,376 22,560 26,784 11,798 24,305 26,260 
Number of Slots 22 38 156 0 84 300 
1993 
Average Attendance 47,963 38,404 25,355 n/a 22,629 27,903 
Number of Slots 22 30 166 2 110 330 
1994 
Average Attendance 46,122 39,769 28,056 28,980 22,936 28,624 
Number of Slots 18 40 152 22 120 352 
1995 
Average Attendance 46,454 39,047 26,617 30,544 25,988 29,078 
Number of Slots 18 44 142 38 110 352 
1996 
Average Attendance 55,328 37,129 25,250 28,787 28,876 29,637 
Number of Slots 20 42 116 52 122 352 
1997 
Average Attendance 41,353 37,440 29,901 31,039 34,424 33,187 
Number of Slots 20 44 96 46 136 352 
1998 
Average Attendance 47,794 40,176 28,732 29,970 36,029 34,768 
Number of Slots 14 44 94 76 124 352 
1999 
Average Attendance 44,949 43,277 31,787 26,691 32,498 32793 
Number of Slots 38 44 62 76 132 352 
2000 
Average Attendance 38,364 37,176 35,605 27,678 30,886 32,618 
Number of Slots 8 46 72 86 140 352 
2001 
Average Attendance 64,576 42,155 30,478 31,096 32,270 33,643 
Number of Slots 10 42 84 88 128 352 
2002 
Average Attendance 57,801 43,270 28,627 34,409 27,024 32,066 
Number of Slots 8 42 82 88 132 352 
2003 
Average Attendance 50,946 42,338 31,276 36,134 28,913 33,371 
Average Attendance, 2000–2003 52,922 41,235 31,497 32,329 29,773 32,925 
Source: AFL. 
Note: two slots = one game. 
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Table 3: 2003 Slot Allocations Ranked by Average Attendance in 2002  
Club 
(Category) Other 
Friday 
Night 
Saturday
(Day) 
Saturday
Night Sunday 
Total 
Slots 
Average 
Attendance
2002 
Collingwood 
(Big-4, Vic) 3 6 4 7 2 22 50,443 
Essendon 
(Big-4, Vic) 1 8 5 4 4 22 45,587 
Hawthorn 
(Vic) 0 4 5 4 9 22 35,296 
Richmond 
(Big-4, Vic) 1 3 5 8 5 22 35,278 
Adelaide 
(Non-Vic) 0 3 4 4 11 22 33,814 
Carlton 
(Big-4, Vic) 0 3 7 4 8 22 33,679 
Brisbane 
(Non-Vic) 1 0 3 12 6 22 30,326 
Geelong 
(Vic) 0 2 7 3 10 22 30,285 
Melbourne 
(Vic) 1 3 8 3 7 22 29,994 
West Coast 
(Non-Vic) 0 1 7 4 10 22 28,735 
Western Bulldogs 
(Vic) 0 1 2 5 14 22 28,361 
Port Adelaide 
(Non-Vic) 0 2 4 7 9 22 27,600 
Sydney 
(Non-Vic) 0 1 3 10 8 22 27,349 
St. Kilda 
(Vic) 1 1 7 5 8 22 26,596 
Kangaroos 
(Vic) 0 4 5 5 8 22 25,647 
Freemantle 
(Non-Vic) 0 0 6 3 13 22 24,009 
Total 8 42 82 88 132 352  
Average Attendances 50,946 42,338 31,349 36,134 28,913  32,066 
Big-4 Share 
(25% of Total) 62.5% 47.6% 25.6% 26.2 14.39%   
Other Victorian Share 
(37.5% of Total) 25.0% 35.7% 41.5% 28.4% 42.4%   
Non-Victorian Share 
(37.% of Total) 12.5% 16.7% 32.9% 45.4% 43.2%   
Source: Slot data from AFL; other calculations by authors. 
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Table 4: Results of OLS Regressions for Friday + Other Club Allocation Shares, , 1990–2002 ijtS
Regressor Coefficient  Standard Error  T-Ratio [Prob] 
Intercept and Club Intercept Dummies 
INPT 0.09  0.014   6.79 [.000] 
DRICH –0.13  0.059   –2.28 [.024] 
(DBULL+DCARL+DGEE+DHAW) –0.07  0.008   –7.75 [.000] 
DNONVICTORIAN –0.07  0.008   –7.96 [.000] 
Slope Coefficient and Slope Dummies for Individual Clubs 
ATTSt-1 0.34  0.174   1.94 [.054] 
DMELBATTSt-1 –0.80  0.148   –5.40 [.000] 
DRICHATTSt-1 1.31  0.818   1.60 [.111] 
DKLDAATTSt-1 –1.16  0.154   –7.56 [.000] 
2002 Broadcasting Dummies (Intercept and Slope) 
D2002 –0.14  0.036   –4.00 [.000] 
D2002ATTSt-1 2.20  0.542   4.07 [.000] 
Time Adjustment Coefficients (Including Club Dummies) 
1/Time 0.06  0.025   2.26 [.025] 
(DCOLL+DESS)1/Time –0.26  0.042   –6.21 [.000] 
(DBRIS+DBULL+DCARL+DGEE+DHAW)1/Time –0.07  0.032   –2.14 [.034] 
Three Outlier Dummies 
DHAW2002 0.11  0.029   3.81 [.000] 
DSYD1992 0.08  0.028   2.74 [.007] 
DWCST1990 0.10  0.029   3.20 [.002] 
R-Squared = 0.59660 R-Bar-Squared = 0.55705 F-Stat F(15,153)   15.085  [.000] 
Diagnostic Tests 
Test Statistics  LM Version F Version 
A. Serial Correlation   CHSQ (1) = 0.051450 [.821] F(1,152) = 0.046288      [.830] 
B. Functional Form CHSQ (1) = 0.045984 [.830] F(1,152) = 0.041370      [.839] 
C. Normality CHSQ (2) = 1.9410 [.379] Not Applicable 
D. Heteroscedasticity CHSQ (1) = 0.001975 [.965] F(1,167) = 0.0019519    [.965] 
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Table 5: Implied AFL Friday + Other Slot Allocation Rule, 1990–2002 
 Long-Run Equilibrium Share of 
Friday + Other Allocations 
Add Transitory Short-
Run effects 
Club 
Autonomous 
Allocation 
Share* 
Weight Given to a 
Club’s Attendance 
Share** 
Weight Multiplying 
the Inverse of Time 
(1/t) 
1990–2001 (Pre-Broadcasting Contract) 
Big-4    
Carlton 0.02 –0.01 
Collingwood and Essendon 0.09 
0.34 
0.34 –0.20 
Richmond –0.04 1.65 0.06 
Other Victorian    
Kangaroos 0.09 0.06 
Geelong, Hawthorn, and Bulldogs 0.02 
0.34 
0.34 –0.01 
Melbourne 0.09 –0.46 0.06 
St. Kilda 0.09 –0.82 0.06 
Non-Victorian    
Brisbane 0.02 0.34 –0.01 
Sydney and West Coast 0.02 0.34 0.06 
Incremental 2002 Effects (Post-Broadcasting) 
All Clubs –0.14 +2.20 Nil Effect 
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Table 6: Actual and Model Forecasts of F+O Slot Allocations in 2003 on a Pre-2002 and Post-2002 Basis 
  Actual Share  Forecast Share 
Club Club Attendance Share, 2002 
Actual Share of 
F+O Allocation, 
2003 
Forecast Share:  
Pre-2002 
Allocation Rule 
Forecast Share: 
Post-2002 
Allocation Rule 
Victorian     
Collingwood  10% 18% 11% 18% 
Essendon 9% 18% 11% 16% 
Carlton 7% 6% 5% 5% 
Richmond 7% 8% 8% 8% 
Melbourne 6% 8% 7% 5% 
Geelong 6% 4% 5% 3% 
Hawthorn  7% 8% 5% 5% 
Kangaroos 5% 8% 11% 8% 
Bulldogs 6% 2% 5% 2% 
St. Kilda 5% 4% 5% 2% 
Non-Victorian     
Brisbane 5% 2% 5% 2% 
Sydney 6% 2% 4% 3% 
West Coast 6% 2% 5% 2% 
Note: Figures rounded for convenience. 
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Table 7: Results of OLS Regressions for SatN+Sun Slot Shares, , 1990–2002 ijtS
Regressor Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob] 
Intercept and Club Intercept Dummies 
INPT 0.06 9.003 [.000] 
DNON-VICTORIAN 0.05 8.019 [.000] 
Lagged Dependent Variable and Projected F+O Slots 
PREVIOUS SEASON SHARE OF SatN+Sun SLOTS,  1ijtS 0.18 2.828 [.005] 
PROJECTED CURRENT F+O SLOTS,  tOFiS ,,ˆ  –0.13 –3.660 [.000] 
Slope Coefficient and Slope Dummies for Non-Vic and Individual Clubs 
ATTSt-1 –0.13 –1.765 [.079] 
DHAWATTSt-1 –0.16 –2.667 [.008] 
DNON-VICTORIAN POST 1994ATTSt-1 –1.42 –3.477 [.001] 
(DNON-VICTORIAN POST 1994ATTSt-1)2 14.13 2.035 [.044] 
Five Outlier Dummies 
DBULL (1990 and 1992) 0.04 3.708 [.000] 
DBULL (1993 and 1997) –0.04 –4.104 [.000] 
DGEE (1995 and 1996) –0.04 –4.151 [.000] 
DRICH1993 0.04 2.660 [.009] 
DSYD1990 0.03 2.034 [.044] 
R-Squared = 0.78 R-Bar-Squared = 0.76     F-Stat = 46.13 
Diagnostic Tests 
Test Statistics  LM Version  [Prob] LM Version  [Prob] 
A. Serial Correlation   CHSQ (1) = 0.273 [.601] CHSQ (1) = 0.251 [.617] 
B. Functional Form CHSQ (1) = 0.997 [.318] CHSQ (1) = 0.902 [.339] 
C. Normality CHSQ (2) = 0.495 [.781] Not Applicable 
D. Heteroscedasticity CHSQ (1) = 0.149 [.699] CHSQ (1) = 0.147 [.701] 
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Table 8: Actual Allocations and Model Forecasts for SatN+Sun and Sat, 2003 
 SatN+Sun Slots Saturday Slots 
Club 
Actual Share of 
SatN+Sun 
Slots in 2003 
Forecast Share of 
SatN+Sun 
Slots in 2003 
Actual Number of 
Saturday Slots, 
2003 
Forecast of 
Saturday Slots, 
2003 
Victorian     
Carlton 5% 6% 7 6 
Collingwood  4% 4% 4 6 
Essendon 4% 4% 5 6 
Richmond 6% 4% 5 6 
Melbourne 5% 6% 8 7 
Geelong 6% 6% 7 7 
Hawthorn  6% 3% 5 8 
Kangaroos 6% 5% 4 5 
Bulldogs 9% 6% 4 7 
St. Kilda 6% 7% 6 6 
Non-Victorian     
Brisbane 8% 9% 3 3 
Sydney 8% 8% 3 3 
West Coast 6% 8% 7 3 
Note: Columns 4 and 5 figures rounded to nearest integer for convenience. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Slot j’s Percentage Share of Total by Year, 1990–2003 
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Figure 2: Allocation of Slots as a Function of Attendance 
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Figure 3: Dynamic Adjustment of Slot Allocation as a Function of Time 
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Figure 4: Actual and Fitted Values of Saturday Slots, 1990–2002 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix: Full Report of OLS Regressions for Friday + Other Club Allocation Shares, , 1990–2002 
Regressor Coefficient  Standard Error  T-Ratio [Prob] 
Intercept and Club Intercept Dummies 
INPT 0.09 0.017   5.10 [.000] 
DRICH –0.16 0.068   –2.35 [.020] 
(DBULL+DCARL+DGEE+DHAW) –0.07 0.009   –7.54 [.000] 
DNONVICTORIAN –0.06 0.010   –5.26 [.000] 
Slope Coefficient and Slope Dummies for Individual Clubs 
ATTSt-1 0.37 0.304   1.20 [.228] 
DMELBATTSt-1 –0.78 0.155   –5.03 [.000] 
DRICHATTSt-1 1.59 0.909   1.75 [.082] 
DKLDAATTSt-1 –1.15 0.161   –7.17 [.000] 
(DBRIS+DSYDNEY)*ATTSt-1 –0.37 0.213   –1.72 [.087] 
2002 Broadcasting Dummies (Intercept and Slope) 
D2002 –0.14 0.037   –3.94 [.000] 
D2002ATTSt-1 2.20 0.552   3.99 [.000] 
Time Adjustment Coefficients (Including Club Dummies) 
1/Time 0.05 0.027   1.74 [.083] 
(DCOLL+DESS)1/Time –0.24 0.049   –4.87 [.000] 
(DBRIS+DBULL+DCARL+DGEE+DHAW)1/Time –0.06 0.033   –1.76 [.080] 
Performance Variables 
Point Scored/Maximum Possible Points (t-1) 0.02 0.021   0.80 [.426] 
Made it to Playoffs Dummy (t-1) –0.01 0.007   –1.15 [.251] 
Big-4 Dummy 
DBIG-4  0.04 0.039   0.93 [.353] 
Three Outlier Dummies 
DHAW2002 0.11 0.029   3.93 [.000] 
DSYDNEY1992 0.08 0.028   2.83 [.005] 
DWCST1990 0.09 0.030   2.83 [.005] 
R-Squared = 0.61083 R-Bar-Squared = 0.55824 F-Stat F(20,148)   11.6149  [.000] 
Diagnostic Tests 
Test Statistics  LM Version F Version 
A. Serial Correlation   CHSQ (1) = 0.146 [.702] F(1,147) = 0.127      [.721] 
B. Functional Form CHSQ (1) = 0.162 [.687] F(1,147) = 0.141      [.707] 
C. Normality CHSQ (2) = 1.57 [.456] Not Applicable 
D. Heteroscedasticity CHSQ (1) = 0.00226 [.988] F(1,167) = 0.0023    [.988] 
 
